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Welfare state spending correlates positively with economic wealth and 
democratisation. The richest and most democratic countries spend most on the 
welfare state.
Democratisation and economic wealth correlate positively. Of the 41 countries 
included here the ten richest have been democracies for decades while the ten 
poorest have only enjoyed a shorter period of democratisation. 
Rich countries are older than poor ones, this is one reason why they spend a 
larger proportion of their social budget on pensions.
To build the welfare state developing countries should grow the economy and 
introduce full civil and political freedom. 
To make democratic welfare states fair and responsive to the needs of many, 
representatives from a broad social spectrum should be included in decisions 
about social policies.
It takes many decades to build mature welfare states, even in democracies with 
growing economies. Eastern Europe has been democratic for more than two 
decades, but it is still poorer than the west of the EU and spending on social 
security is lower.
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Introduction
Scholars of the welfare state have long focused on a 
relatively small number of mature post-industrial political 
economies, above all the member states of the European 
Union, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and Japan. As a consequence, our knowledge 
of why welfare states developed and how they change 
over the long term is based on these countries (Haggard 
and Kaufman 2008: 1-24; Schmitt, Lierse et al. 2015). 
On the one hand such a focus makes a lot of sense: 
only these rich nations spend significant amounts of 
national wealth on pensions, health and education, 
which are the key social policy areas. Understanding 
the reason for their growth, but also for the differences 
between them is important.  The pragmatist can learn 
from similar countries for policy-making: how do they 
approach ageing societies, unemployment, increased 
demand for educated workforces?  What works well, 
what does not? The theorist will understand better 
factors responsible for national differences by asking why 
countries of similar wealth and social spending adopted 
different social protection systems. Why is access to the 
health service based on citizenship in the UK but on 
employment in Germany, for example? Through such 
comparisons scholars have gained important insights 
into the significance for welfare state development of 
national political movements, institutional structures, 
religious and cultural traditions.
On the other hand, the focus on rich nations’ welfare 
states has weaknesses, too. Theories run the risk of 
becoming insular, of losing the big picture. For example, 
do we really need an “industry” of welfare state model-
making, as developed in the wake of the publication 
of the now classic book “The three worlds of welfare 
capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990)? It discusses for 
example whether country X should be labelled as “social 
democratic” or “conservative”, considering the specific 
features of X’s unemployment programmes. Arguably 
there are more significant welfare issues in the world. 
One of them is the growth of Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa whose economies are big enough to 
overtake many EU countries soon. In addition, other 
Asian nations are also developing fast. From a global 
standpoint Asia is more dynamic than Europe and its 
populations’ needs for pensions, health and education 
are less satisfied.
The following analysis uses the western lens to look 
further afield. The aim is to explore what we can expect 
for welfare states in the developing Asian countries when 
we apply our knowledge of why, when and how Western 
welfare states expanded to their current size. After an 
overview of welfare spending in Asia and the EU today 
this paper will present two theories of comparative social 
policy analysis which argued that the shape of today’s 
western welfare states can be explained by economic 
development and political conflict. Assuming their 
rationale, it will then compare economic, demographic 
and democratic trends in the EU and Asia and ask what 
can be expected for further welfare state growth in the 
developing Asian nations. The paper will conclude with 
some considerations for policy-making.
The size of the welfare state  
in the EU and Asia
Welfare states protect citizens against the central risks 
of (post-)industrial societies and prepare them for active 
adult lives; this is why we find that in many countries the 
aims of the most significant programmes are the same: 
to educate, to protect against illness, unemployment 
and other reasons for income loss and to prevent poverty 
in old age. These are expensive ambitions. Graph 1 gives 
an overview of how much of their overall economic 
wealth European and Asian countries spent on the most 
central three of these areas in the 2000s: public health, 
education and pensions.1 These figures only show their 
significance in relation to overall national wealth. Wealth 
levels themselves differ much, too, as we will see below.
* The author wishes to thank Julia Müller & Giang Pham of the FES as well as my colleagues Zhao Quing, Dr Tobias Wiss and Dr Chung-Yang Yeh for 
making time to read a draft of this paper and for their excellent comments.
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1 The figures do not show who is entitled to benefits, and how generous the systems are; they do not distinguish between public and non-state 
provision and they ignore informal welfare. In the absence of detailed data they do indicate the extent of public involvement in the biggest area of 
social provision.
The EU countries and Japan spend by far the most, 
around a quarter of GDP, within the remaining Asian 
countries the highest relative spenders are Vietnam, 
Mongolia and South Korea (ca. 15% GDP), the lowest 
are Sri Lanka and Indonesia with around six per cent. 
Spending priorities also differ. In Europe and Japan 
pensions are the largest item, while the other Asian 
countries spend money on health and education but 
little on pensions. The next sections will explore reasons 
for these differences.
Explaining welfare state growth 
in the West – two classics
Economic Growth – the Logic of Industrialism 
Harold Wilensky (1975) conducted one of the most 
influential comparative welfare state studies of the 
1970s and 1980s. It is among the few classics that took 
a global perspective, including 64 rich and poor nations. 
Therefore, it is particularly interesting in this context. 
Wilensky was struck by the fact that all developed 
industrial countries had health and welfare programmes 
while poor countries did not. This did not mean the 
rich were alike, on the contrary the organizational style 
of their welfare programmes varied widely, among 
them were democracies and authoritarian regimes and 
those in power gave different reasons for initiating 
and maintaining them. Wilensky’s point was that this 
notwithstanding, large social programmes had emerged 
as “structural uniformities of modern societies” (p. 1). On 
this basis the conclusion was inescapable that without 
economic growth there would be no welfare state 
development. Industrialisation leads to a fundamental 
change of social relationships. As it unfolds people move 
from non-monetised agrarian social networks to cities, 
where they become dependent on labour contracts and 
regular incomes for survival. Within this new mode, 
children appear as less reliable insurance for old age than 
Source: Health/Education: UNDP 2014); pensions: OECD 2015: 183 and World Bank.
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savings. Thus, market dependent individuals have fewer 
children, are more reliant on labour contracts for survival 
and need more money from social insurance. The study 
has had many critics, which pointed in particular to the 
differences between the more developed welfare states 
that cannot be explained by economic growth. However, 
the economy as key driver of the welfare state has never 
been dismissed by academics (e.g. Schmitt, Lierse et al. 
2015). The assumption that economic change affects 
the balance of power within society and therefore the 
scope for social policies is still relevant.
Political Power
Adopting a geographical scope smaller than Wilensky, 
focusing on Europe and OECD countries, Walter Korpi’s 
power based theory of welfare state growth is interested 
in which groups in a society have the ability to enforce 
their view on other societal groups (Korpi 2006). The 
more potential a group has to actually exert power, the 
more society will be shaped according to its preferences. 
In his research Korpi examined the organisations that 
control national economies, based on the assumption 
that the economy is the source of greatest societal 
wealth. The central empirical insight was that the quality 
and scope of a welfare state depends on the outcome 
of the struggle between employers and conservative 
political forces on the one and trade unions and left 
wing power on the other hand. In countries where 
organised labour has been persistently strong the 
welfare state will be more generous than in countries 
where organised capital is strong and well-embedded. 
Of course the power resource model was a child of 
its time – developed in the early 1970s it focused on 
the traditional political conflicts of industrial society 
and did not consider alternative social movements or 
interests not defined by the conflict between workers 
and employers. The approach has been criticised for this 
narrow frame, but the argument is generally accepted 
that the welfare state in a democratic society is the 
result of political struggles for the distribution of the 
resources created there, and that control of the economy 
is therefore a key issue (Baldwin 1990; Brady and Lee 
2014). Perhaps a bigger problem is that the literature 
has been primarily concerned with democracies and 
therefore the implications of this insight for countries 
with strong authoritarian legacies are less clear. There are 
good reasons to expect that welfare states develop less 
well in authoritarian systems: those in power here will 
be under pressure from the elites to rule in their favour. 
In contrast, where political decisions can be challenged 
through electoral competition such favouritism is likely 
to be penalised and there is a much better chance that 
social policies are designed with broad constituencies in 
mind (e.g. Ha 2012: 544). Despite the plausibility of the 
argument, empirical research in this area has not been 
as broad and therefore the evidence less substantial (Yi 
and Woo 2015). 
With the exception of Japan the Asian countries spend 
less of their national wealth on the welfare state than 
all EU member states. Western theories would suggest 
that economic strength and the distribution of political 
power are the reason for such differences. The next 
sections will compare countries’ economic, demographic 
and political conditions. 
Economic strength and demographic change: 
EU and Asia
Asian developing countries have certainly grown fast 
since 1990 and much more than EU member states or 
the established Asian economies. At the top China’s 
economy grew more than sevenfold between 1990 and 
2011, followed by Eastern Europe and the developing 
Asian countries which at least doubled the size of their 
economies, some tripled it. In stark contrast, the richest 
countries expanded little, the 17 richest EU countries 
grew by 29 per cent, Japan by 24 per cent (UNDP 2014). 
However, growth and wealth are not the same. Despite 
rapid growth only Korea is near the richest EU countries 
and Japan; and Malaysia’s wealth is comparable with 
the Eastern European member states. All other Asian 
countries are much poorer. Even China’s huge growth 
over the last decade puts it third place only among the 
developing Asian nations, after Thailand and Malaysia, 
and the size of the Chinese economy is still only a third 
that of Europe’s (Graph 2). 
The argument that industrialisation and demographic 
change are connected suggests that the richer societies 
should be older. This is true, Japan and the EU have 
the highest dependency rates by a margin while 
Mongolia, the Philippines, Bhutan, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Nepal and Vietnam have very low rates (Graph 3). This 
notwithstanding, there are big differences within the 
older group: Japan is not much richer but a lot older 
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states but the former’s social spending is much lower. 
In a similar vein, Mongolia and Vietnam spend more 
than all other developing countries. The section below 
discusses possible explanations for such inconsistencies.
Democracy and political power – 
Europe and Asia
Political power and types of European welfare
During the 1960s and early 1970s welfare states 
in the European Union expanded: spending grew, 
programmes became more inclusive, benefits and 
services more generous. However, entitlements were 
also quite different. The Nordic welfare states granted 
benefits and services based on citizenship and outcomes 
were the most egalitarian. In the continental welfare 
states benefit levels mirrored employment status and 
confirmed traditional gender divisions, services were 
underdeveloped. Here poverty was avoidable for 
people living in traditional breadwinner households, but 
than Korea. Within Europe the Latin rim countries are 
the oldest, even though they are the poorer part of the 
rich group. Against this background the low pension 
spending of the poorer countries is easier to understand.
Bringing together welfare spending, economic growth 
and ageing trends we find substantial evidence for the 
industrialism thesis: rich countries are older than poor 
ones, they spend more on welfare, relatively, as a share 
of GDP and absolutely, because their GDP is much higher. 
Moreover, pensions are their largest programmes. This 
would suggest that in order to grow the welfare state 
developing countries must grow the economy. However, 
the experience of the richer nations also suggests that 
larger economies lead to increased dependency rates 
through ageing. Part of the greater spending is therefore 
explained by more claimants, not by more generous 
benefits. 
We should also note that the figures do not completely 
align with the theories. In particular, the wealth of Korea 
and Malaysia is similar to the Eastern European member 
Source: UNDP (2014). 2011 purchasing power parities in USD. Thousands.
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inequalities were greater than in the Nordic countries. 
Social policy in the UK and Ireland focused on means-
tested benefits, supplemented by non-state welfare, 
leading to greater inequalities than in the two groups 
above and putting at risk of poverty low earners and 
single parents in particular (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Finally, Southern European welfare states mainly catered 
for labour market insiders, particularly through generous 
pensions, women, the young and the low qualified 
were particularly disadvantaged (Ferrera 2000). Scholars 
argued that political power explained these differences. 
In the Nordic countries trade unions and social democratic 
parties were strong and had long parliamentary 
legacies, thus achieving more socially just outcomes 
for citizens. In continental countries such as Germany 
and Austria business was better organised than labour 
and the churches had some clout in parliaments. As a 
consequence, the welfare state pursued conservative 
gender policies and accepted occupational inequality 
(Kersbergen 1995). In the UK, too, the power of the 
labour movement had been curbed since 1980 and 
the long incumbency of Conservative governments 
strengthened the liberal welfare state. 
The European experience shows that political conflicts 
matter for the quality of welfare states. A substantial 
budget is needed to finance pensions, health, and 
education. These key programmes are therefore 
Graph 3
Old-age dependency ration (ratio of population aged 65+ per 100 population 15-64) Asia and EU
Source: United Nations (2015)
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forever embattled by interest groups; the traditional 
representatives of labour and capital have been 
important, but they are not the only combatants. In the 
1970s when the power resource model was created 
industrial working classes were much larger than today, 
making the focus on the conflict between labour and 
capital more obvious. However, even then farmers, the 
middle classes and other social movements had political 
influence (Baldwin 1990). Today, the field for the politics 
of welfare and social policy-making is far more diverse 
and contemporary studies reflect this (e.g. Häusermann 
2010). Thus when assessing the scope for future social 
policy expansion in Asian developing countries the 
research above teaches us that the institutionalised 
strength of labour and capital matter, but we must 
also pay attention to the women’s movements, to 
environmental campaigners, to health and pensioner 
groups. However, what happens when interest groups 
are prevented from expressing themselves in the first 
place? If political conflict and competition is important 
for the welfare state, will it grow in countries where civil 
and political liberties have been heavily circumscribed 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008: 13-7)?
Democracies, economies 
and welfare states
Recent comparative studies have concluded that rising 
income levels increase the probability of democratization 
and that government’s spending in democracies is higher 
than in non-democracies (Boix 2011; Brooks 2015: 561-
2; Yi and Woo 2015). Against this background, I will 
compare the democratic legacies of the 13 Asian and 
27 EU countries included here, relating the results to 
economic strength and welfare spending.
Graph 4 contrasts democratic legacies and economic 
wealth. It shows for how long citizens have been able to 
express themselves democratically since 1972 and plots 
this against their current national wealth.2  Political liberty 
has existed the longest in Japan and in the eighteen 
long-term EU members, for many the period has been 
much longer than measured here. In these eighteen 
countries, welfare programmes and institutions evolved 
under conditions of electoral competition. Fourteen 
countries have experienced a shorter, but still considerable 
democratic period (15-34 years): Continental and 
Eastern European EU members, Korea, Mongolia and 
India. Nine countries are rated as ‘not free’. In these 
Asian countries existing welfare programmes have been 
strongly influenced by the position of autocratic rulers. 
Democratisation and economic wealth correlate 
positively. Outliers are Malaysia because it is richer than 
its democratic record would lead us to expect and India 
which is among the poorest, despite its long history of 
civil and political liberty. 
Nevertheless, political liberalisation does not appear 
to be a quick road to riches. The Eastern and Central 
European countries have been free for more than twenty 
years without being able to reach the wealth levels 
of the top group and in the EU the poorest countries 
have the most recent authoritarian legacies. Moreover, 
Mongolia and India show that sustained freedom is 
not a sufficient condition for accumulating economic 
wealth. This notwithstanding, no country in the sample 
has restricted liberty and at the same time developed 
great wealth. Our evidence is not strong enough to 
conclude that democracy causes economic growth but 
it certainly shows that adopting civil and political rights 
has not harmed economies.
 
Public social spending also correlates positively with 
wealth and freedom (Graph 5). The 7 longest EU 
members and Japan have enjoyed the greatest civil and 
political liberties, they are the richest and they also spend 
most on the welfare state, in real and relative terms. 
There is some variation between them, Japan spends 
less on welfare than many of the EU17, but the UK and 
Ireland are similar. Spain, Greece and Portugal are the 
lowest welfare spenders in this group, they are also the 
poorest here and gained their full freedom only before 
joining the EU in the 1970s. The Central and Eastern 
European member states are in the middle in terms of 
wealth, spending and freedom. Regarding wealth and 
2 The analysis is based on the research of „Freedom House“, an independent think tank which documents the development of democracy, rule of law, 
social and economic freedoms in countries around the world. https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world
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Source: democracy: www.freedomhouse.org: Wealth: UNDP (2014).
Graph 4
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Source: Health/Education: UNDP (2014); pensions: OECD 2015: 183 and World Bank. Cyprus & Malta excluded, no pension figures.
Graph 5
Gross national income per capita (2013) & health/education/pension expenditure % of GDP (various years 2005-11)
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democracy Korea is also part of this middle group, however, 
its welfare spending is a lot lower.
The least free countries are the poorest and spend the 
least on welfare. Within this group the most notable 
outliers are Vietnam and Mongolia which dedicate 
a high share of their wealth to health, education and 
pensions, India which is poor with a weak welfare state 
but a strong democracy and Malaysia, where despite 
relative wealth democracy has not developed.
Our evidence shows that strong welfare states have 
developed under conditions of economic wealth, civil and 
political liberties. However, the cases that do not quite fit 
this pattern – India, Malaysia, Mongolia, Korea, Vietnam, 
for example – suggest that additional factors are at work 
(Yi and Woo 2015). Research is patchy, but according 
to recent studies international institutions like the ILO 
have encouraged the adoption of social programmes, 
independent of economic development (Schmitt, Lierse 
et al. 2015). Moreover, the legacy of state socialism has 
made a difference. In Vietnam, Mongolia and China 
former Communist parties continued to govern during 
the difficult transitions of the state owned economies; 
thus universalism remained a part of political culture and 
of state bureaucracies (Fritz 2008; London 2014: 103). 
In contrast, part of the political ideology of governments 
in Korea and Malaysia was a “developmental” approach 
to welfare, leading to relatively low social spending: in 
the 1990s governments used social policy to industrialise 
and develop the economies. Intervention benefited 
workers in large companies and the public sector, the 
poor received nothing and large social inequalities 
remained (Holliday 2000; Kwon 2009: 12).
How to strengthen the 
welfare state in Asian  
developing countries
Based on Western modernisation theories this paper 
has explored the prospect for the expansion of the 
welfare state in Asian developing countries. It has shown 
a correlation of economic development, democracy and 
social spending. The richest countries have the most 
developed welfare states and long legacies of civil and 
political liberties, for the poorest countries the opposite 
is true. There is India’s combination of poverty and 
democracy but no country is rich and authoritarian. 
From this follows that to build welfare states countries 
should grow their economy and introduce full civil and 
political liberties. More investment in education, in 
unemployment benefits and health services is likely to be 
a consequence, because in democratic societies interest 
groups will request such intervention and policy makers 
know that education and health increase productivity 
which again boosts economic growth. Pension insurance 
and health care will also be on the agenda because 
ageing populations need more of both (also ADB 2011). 
However, because the developing Asian nations are still 
relatively young, demands comparable to the West or 
Japan are not to be expected in the near future.
To be sure facilitating economic growth and political 
liberalisation is not straightforward. For a start, 
authoritarian governments such as China, Vietnam or 
Bhutan are unlikely to embrace democratic reform for 
economic gain. However, to develop the economy is 
priority for them as much as for any government and 
if successful, democratic transition will be more likely. 
In addition, while, economic development and political 
liberalisation might well pave the way for more equal 
societies, this is will not happen fast. We have seen that 
Eastern Europe is still lagging behind the West more 
than two decades after the collapse of state-socialism. 
Finally, economic wealth and democratic rights do not 
automatically lead to societal fairness. The inclusiveness 
of European welfare states differs due to the strength of 
trade unions, employers and other organised interests. 
Democracy creates a favourable context for higher 
welfare spending and it opens opportunities for many 
to participate in conflicts about social policies, but 
whether greater equality follows depends on who enters 
the struggle and who wins. Thus, “…a broad policy 
and higher level of government spending are probably 
a necessary, but definitely not a sufficient condition for 
an equal society” (Yi and Woo 2015: 488). In order for 
welfare states to be socially inclusive we need democracies 
which are open to representatives from a wide social 
spectrum. To hear those who do not have loud voices 
is particularly pertinent for Asian developing countries 
where the poor make up a large part of the population 
but are only weakly organised politically (Brooks 2015: 
552). This notwithstanding, after a turbulent decade 
EU countries would do well to consider, too, whose 
interests are served or side-lined in their more generous 
welfare states.
9
Democracies, Economies and Social Protection
References
ADB (2011): Asian Development Outlook 2011. Update. Preparing for Demographic Transition. Metro Manila, Asian 
Development Bank, www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29086/adu2011.pdf 
Baldwin, P. (1990). The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Boix, C. (2011). “Democracy, Development, and the International System.” American Political Science Review 105(4): 
809-828.
Brady, D. and H. Y. Lee (2014). “The rise and fall of government spending in affluent democracies, 1971-2008.” Journal 
of European Social Policy 24(1): 56-79.
Brooks, S. M. (2015). “Social Protection for the Poorest: The Adoption of Antipoverty Cash Transfer Programs in the 
Global South.” Politics & Society 43(4): 551-582.
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge, Polity Press.
Ferrera, M. (2000). Reconstructing the welfare state in Southern Europe. Survival of the European Welfare State. M. 
Ferrera and S. Kuhnle. London, Routledge: 166-182.
Fritz , V. (2008). “Mongolia: The Rise and Travails of a Deviant Democracy.” Democratization 15 (4): 766-788.
Ha, E. (2012). “Globalization, Government Ideology, and Income Inequality in Developing Countries.” Journal of Politics 
74(2): 541-557.
Haggard, S. and R. Kaufman (2008). Development, democracy and welfare states. Latin America, East Asia and Eastern 
Europe. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Häusermann, S. (2010). The politics of welfare state reform in continental Europe. Modernization in hard times. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Holliday, I. (2000). “Productivist welfare capitalism: Social policy in East Asia.” Political Studies 48(4): 706-723.
Kersbergen, K. v. (1995). Social Capitalism. A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State. London, Routledge.
Korpi, W. (2006). Power resources and employer-centered approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of 
capitalism - Protagonists, consenters, and antagonists. 19th Meeting of the ISA-Research-Committee, Chicago, IL, 
Johns Hopkins Univ Press.
Kwon, H. J. (2009). “The reform of the developmental welfare state in East Asia.” International Journal of Social Welfare 
18: S12-S21.
London, J. D. (2014). “Welfare Regimes in China and Vietnam.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 44(1): 84-107.
OECD (2015). Pensions at a glance. Paris.
Schmitt, C., H. Lierse, et al. (2015). “The Global Emergence of Social Protection: Explaining Social Security Legislation 
1820-2013.” Politics & Society 43(4): 503-524.
UNDP (2014): United Nations Human Development Index 1980-2013. http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
United Nations. (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/.
World Bank. Pensions: Data. Pensions Spending 4Q2013. http://webworldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/
EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTPENSIONS/0,,contentMDK:23231994~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:396253,00.html
Yi, D. J. and J. H. Woo (2015). “Democracy, policy, and inequality: Efforts and consequences in the developing world.” 
International Political Science Review 36(5): 475-492.
10
Traute Meyer
REGIONAL
 www.fes-asia.org 
Imprint
© 2016 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia
7500A Beach Road
#12-320/321/322 
The Plaza
Responsible:
Adrienne Woltersdorf  |  Resident Director 
Natalia Figge  |  Project Manager
Phone: +65 6297 6760  |  Fax: +65 6297 6762 
Website: www.fes-asia.org
Facebook: 
To order publication:
info@fes.asia
Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written
consent of the FES.
About the author
Traute Meyer is Professor of Social Policy at the 
University of Southampton. Her research has focused on 
change in European welfare systems and its impact on 
citizens, particularly in the area of pensions. Since 2007 
she has been the editor for the Journal of European 
Social Policy. In recent years she has visited China and 
is interested in comparing European and Asian social 
policies.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily 
those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany.  
The foundation is named after Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany.
The Regional Programme in Asia complements FES programmes and projects on the global and national level.  
Its approach and focus is going beyond the national level by responding to the trends of globalisation, labour mobility, 
regional integration and connectivity in all areas of life. The projects conducted under its framework target to build 
transnational networks and coalitions between individuals and organisations and promote change for more  
social justice, sustainable peace, economic development in the region.
